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ABSTRACT
While organization and agency theories have different perspectives of
controls, both bring Important contributions to a theoretical carriage . This
study Integrates these theories to develop and test predictions about the use
and configuration of Inforaatlon-based controls. Controls are shown to be a
function of the Influence of strategy and structure on uncertainty and task
observability. A diversification strategy that Increases organizational
uncertainty Is linked to the use of real-tlae accounting Inforaatlon systens.
internal auditing Is associated with a foraallzed structure that creates the
need to enforce rule coapllance on the part of employees. Outcoae controls. In
the fora of responsibility accounting Heasureaent systeas, are tied to
structural characteristics that Halt the effectiveness and efficiency of
behavior controls and Increase uncertainty about subordinate aanagers'
behavior. Finally, dependencies between the controls appear to arise because
of their coapleaentary capabilities. In this study, outcoae and behavior
controls are found to be conjunctive as opposed to being substitutes. The
results have lapllcatlons for the design of Inforaatlon-based control systeas
and future controls research.

One of the aany industries deregulated during the Reagan years Mas the
financial industry. Dereguiation authorized savings and loan associations
(S&Ls) to provide the saae services previously reserved for coaaercial banks
and relaxed restrictions on interstate and intrastate branching. The
coBpetitive forces unleashed by deregulation placed increasing pressure on S&Ls
to a) change their strategy by expanding their array of client services and b)
change their structure by increasing the nuaber of locations at Mhich those
services were offered.
Prior to deregulation, the primary business of S&Ls consisted of
residential aortgage lending. These loans have lower risk than other types of
loans due to the nature of the collateral, and, accordingly, provide a lower
rate of return to the lender. Following deregulation, S&Ls were permitted to
expand into new services, many of which offered higher returns but carried
greater risk (e.g., consumer loans and credit cards). Concurrently, S&Ls
gained increased operational lattitude from regulators and experienced
opportunities to expand their warkets into new locations geographically
dispersed from their main facilities. Thus, S&Ls were faced with both
opportunities for strategic and structural change and the accompanying problems
associated with obtaining information to 1) reduce uncertainty about new
services and 2) retain control over subordinates' actions.
This paper examines the effects of strategy and structure in the post-
deregulation period on the types of information-based internal control systems
used by S&Ls. Integrating organizational (Eisenhardt, 1985; Green, Wlesh and
Baker, 1987; Green and Welsh, 1988; Ouchi and Maguire, 1975; Ouchi, 1977) and
economic (Demski, 1980; Jensen and Heckling, 1976; Ross, 1973) perspectives on
control, we predict that diversification into new and high risk services with
greater outcome uncertainty will be related to the use of real-time information
systens of control that provide richer, finer and more timely Information to
the firm. These cybernetic control systems enable the S&L's primary manager to
exercise a greater degree of control over the organization's activities despite
the Increase in outcome uncertainty that results from such diversification.
In addition, we predict that internal auditing and responsibility accounting
controls will be related to structural factors that create a need to enforce
rule compliance and Increase uncertainty about the actions of subordinate
managers. Finally, we predict that these information-based control systems
will be conjunctive, a condition that should result in an ordered pattern of
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control configurations.
Comparison of Organization and Agency Perspectives on Control
The means by which management controls subordinates' behavior is of concern
to both academics and practitioners. Most control studies have taken either an
organizational or an economic approach. However, Elsenhardt (1985) and Jones
(1984) demonstrate that integrating agency theory with extant organizational
research furthers our understanding of Internal controls.
Elsenhardt (1985) compared organization and agency perspectives on control
noting that, while both approaches had commonalities, each makes unique
contributions to a theoretical marriage. Both theories are concerned with the
determinants of control characteristics and the role of information in
exercising control. Organization theory is concerned with goal congruence
between the organization and its members. Agency theory is concerned with
alignment of the principal's (owner's/superior's) interests with the agent's
(subordinate's) interests. Both theories are concerned with efficiency, assume
rationality, and distinguish between behavior and outcome controls. However,
in several respects, each theory makes explicit what the other leaves implicit.
While organization theory Implicitly assumus that control is costly, agency
theory makes this cost explicit through information economics (Demski, 1980).
Both theories regard information as necessary for control, but agency theory
attaches an explicit cost/benefit framework to the production of information.
Information will be produced only to the extent that its marginal benefit
exceeds its marginal cost. In order for information to have value, it must
result in the reduction of uncertainty about some economic outcome or the
inputs that give rise to the outcome. Further, risk is related to outcome
uncertainty, and those who bear risk must be compensated. Therefore,
organization strategies that affect organizational uncertainty, such as
diversification into higher-risk projects, are likely to have an impact on the
organization's control system by virtue of their effect on risk-sharing
arrangements. Thus, agency theory provides an explicit framework, absent in
the organization approach, that considers the costs and benefits of
information-based control systems.
Agency theory regards the firm as a network of contracts between principals
and agents (Jensen and Heckling, 1976). However, it is silent about the
effects of organization structure on the design of control systems while
organization theory makes explicit predictions about the relationship between
structure and control. For example, structural characteristics such as
complexity, formalization and decentralization have been theorectically
associated with the use of information-based control systems (Galbraith, 1973;
Ouchi, 1977). Thus, the structural aspects of internal organization, ignored
by agency theory, are held to be important by organization theory in explaining
internal control configurations.
One important facet of control that is given explicit attention by agency
theory is the role of auditing in reducing moral hazard (i.e. the propensity
for deliberate suboptimization by agents when principals cannot observe their
efforts). In this study, auditing refers to the observation of or
investigation of evidence about subordinate behavior by persons who are not in
the subordinate's chain of conoand. Auditors may be external or internal to
the organization. From an agency perspective, auditing assures principals that
agents' representations of organizational performance are reasonable and valid
(Watts and Zimnerman, 1985). In this role, auditing is used to validate the
inputs to outcome controls. However, auditing can also provide managers with a
means of ascertaining the extent to which subordinates comply with
organizational policies and procedures (Cook and Winkle, 1980). Thus, auditing
controls play an important role that has been largely overlooked In
organization studies of control.
Finally, while organization and agency theories both consider how certain
aspects of tasks affect the type of control used by organizations, the two
approaches provide different insights into the choice of outcome controls over
behavior controls. Organization theory has predicted that behavior control
will be preferred when task prograBmability is high while outcome control will
be used when the opposite condition holds assuming outcomes can be measured
(Ouchi, 1979). Agency theory predicts that behavior control represents the
"first best" internal control and that outcome control will be used only when
circumstances make task observability uneconomical. Further, agency theory
holds that outcome control carries an explicit cost in the form of a risk
premium demanded by agents who are evaluated under outcome controls.
Therefore, outcome control will be used only when agents' actions cannot be
observed at a cost lower than the risk premium and the measurement costs
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associated with outcome control (Demski, 1980). While these predictions
differ in subtle but important ways, they are not incompatible. Ratlier, their
combination offers new insights into the choice of controls.
For example, the critical issue In the decision to use outcome controls may
not be whether it is possible to observe a task per se, but whether it is
possible to observe the task economically (Jones, 1984). This suggests the
choice of behavior versus outcome controls is not Just a function of the nature
of the task but also of other factors, such as organization structure, which
may limit task observability. This proposition holds importance for the design
of information-based controls to complement organization structure. It also
suggests that there is a need for studies which examine the relationship
between organization structure, information cost and controls.
Thus, the integration of organization and agency theories permits insights
into control that are not possible if the theories are taken alone. The
contributions of the theories to this integration are summarized in Figure 1.
{Figure 1.)
Strategy and Information-Based Controls
The decision by S&Ls to offer new and high-risk services increased the need
for information-based controls to reduce the uncertainty associated with the
entrance into new markets. Diversification created the need to track the
status of these new services. Strategic decisions to engage in practices such
as consumer lending had two main effects on S&Ls. First, by offering a full
line of consumer services. SALs were able to compete with banks. Second, there
was an increased degree of risk associated with providing these services.
Although the expected payoffs from many of the new services were higher. S&Ls
faced a corresponding increase in uncertainty which stemmed from a) their
unfamiliarity with the services and b) the inherently riskier nature of some of
the services. Unmitigated, this increased uncertainty represented a cost to
S&Ls in the form of some loss of control over organizational outcomes.
6Previous research on organizational systems of control suggests that
outcone uncertainty notlvates managenent to use systems that provide richer,
finer and more timely Information. These systems allow management to quickly
and selectively receive Information at the level of detail desired. To the
extent that such Information can facilitate corrective action, real-time
information systems assist management In exercising cybernetic control over
organizational outcomes (Galbralth, 1973) and allow management to Influence
future performance (Green, Welsh and Baker, 1987). Agency theory holds that
the value of Information lies In Its ability to reduce uncertainty about
organizational outcomes and the Inputs to those outcomes (Watts and Zimmerman,
1985). Thus, we predict that:
HI: real-tlne Information systems will be used by organizations employing
a diversification strategy that Increases outcome uncertainty.
Structure and Information-Based Controls
Prior studies (e.g. Ouchl and Hagulre. 1975; Ouchl . 1977) suggest that
Internal control may be accomplished by behavior or outcome controls. Behavior
control focuses on governing subordinates' activities through observation of
their behavior while outcome control focuses on relating measures of outcomes
to their actions. Ouchl and Magulre (1975) suggest that behavior and outcome
controls serve somewhat different purposes within the firm. Behavior control
is used when means/end relationships are known while outcome control occurs in
response to managers' needs to provide evidence of performance. In this
section, we posit that behavior control is used to control employee actions
where task programmablllty and observability are high, and outcome control is
used in situations where: a) structure severely limits observation of
subordinates' actions and/or b) subordinates are delegated the authority to
participate in decisions that have a low degree of progratunablllty.
7Behavior Control . Uncertainty also arises because of the potential for
Idiosyncratic actions by employees that result In suboptlmal organization
outcomes. One means of reducing such Idiosyncratic actions Is to promulgate
policies, procedures and rules, referred to as formalization, to guide employee
actions In situations where tasks are highly programmable. Formalization Is
defined as the proportion of codified Jobs and the range of variation that Is
tolerated within the rules defining the jobs. The higher the proportion of
codified Jobs and the less the range of variation allowed, the more formalized
the organization (Ilage, 1965).
Although formalization Is intended to minimize Idiosyncratic actions by
employees and. In turn, reduce outcome uncertainty associated with employee
actions (Van de Ven et al
.
, 1976), a means of enforcing rule compliance must
exist for formalization to be effective. Agency theory (Demskl, 1980; Ross,
1973) suggests that, to enforce behavioral compliance, principals can either
directly observe agents' activities or purchase Information about agents'
behaviors (Elsenhardt, 1985).
It Is usually Impossible for the primary manager of a firm to personally
observe moat employee actions. Therefore, to enforce rules, the firm hires
subordinate managers to observe and direct employee actions. This, however,
does not assure rule compliance because subordinate managers have incentives to
misreport their failure to properly manage (Birnberg et al
.
, 1983). Therefore,
to provide such assurance, the firm can hire Internal auditors or contract with
external auditors to examine and report on evidence of rule compliance. In
this role, internal auditors are generally preferrable to external auditors for
two reasons. First, because internal auditors are employees, not Independent
contractors, the primary manager is better able to direct their activities.
8Second, because Internal auditors are permanent members of the organization,
they are met with less suspicion and are better able to extract information
from other organization nenbers (Williamson, 1975).
Thus, foroallzatlon of policies and procedures provides one means of
aligning employee actions with organization objectives in situations where
tasks are highly programmable and lend themselves to codification.
Formalization requires a means of rule enforcement to be effective, and
internal auditing supplies this means. We predict that:
H2: internal auditing systems will be found in organizations using
formalization to exercise behavior control over employee actions.
Outcome Control . In situations where tasks are not highly programmable or
subordinates' actions cannot easily be observed, outcome control is more likely
to be used. While behavior control involves observing and correcting
subordinates' behavior, outcome control is effected through the use of
measures of performance outcomes. In organization studies, outcome control has
been found to be associated with the absence of task programmability (Ouchi and
Naguire, 1975) and task observability (Jones, 1984). Likewise, agency theory
holds that if agents' efforts cannot be observed a moral hazard is present
indicating the use of outcome controls (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ilolmstrom,
1986). Thus, low task observability and programmability decrease the
effectiveness of behavior control and increase the likelihood that outcome
controls will be used.
Task observability is lessened by the physical distance separating primary
managers from subordinates. In spatially complex (i.e., more dispersed)
organizations, subordinates interact less with the primary manager resulting in
less task observability. For example, it is more difficult for an S&L's chief
executive to visit twenty branches than to visit five branches. Thus, as task
observability decreases, uncertainty about subordinates' actions Increases.
Unmitigated, this increase in uncertainty represents a loss of control.
The delegation of tasks that are not highly programfflable also results in
increased uncertainty. Decentralization, defined in this study as
participation in important and relatively unprograonable decisions by
subordinate managers (Hage and Aiken, 1967), creates opportunities for
suboptimal decisions. Although evidence about decisions may be observed, the
decision processes are unobservable. Agency theory posits that agents make
decisions based upon self-interest. Further, these agents possess information
not held by the primary manager, and, given the opportunity to participate in
decisions, may use their favorable position in this information asymmetry to
effect suboptimal results. Decentralization, then, adds to outcome uncertainty
and results in a loss of control.
In situations where spatial complexity and decentralization reduce the
effectiveness of behavior control, outcome control may be used to obtain goal
congruence by linking subordinates' behaviors to desirable outcomes. The
decision to use outcome control, however, is also a question of efficiency.
Agency theory (Demski, 1980; Ross, 1973) suggests that the choice of outcome
control is a function of the relative efficiency of behavior control in
achieving a sufficient level of control over subordinate actions. Organization
theory (Ouchl and Maguire, 1975; Ouchi , 1977) also suggests that the choice
between outcome and behavior control involves a trade-off between economic
efficiency and risk. Although outcome control is more efficient and conserving
of organizational resources in certain situations (Eisenhardt, 1985; Ouchi and
Maguire, 1975), control systems based on objective measures require
subordinates to bear some of the risk previously borne by the firm,
particularly if compensation is directly contingent on performance outcomes
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(Oemskl, 1980). Subordinates denand higher compensation for bearing this
risk. Thus, outcome control carries a cost and will be used only when this
cost is less than the cost of behavior control.
Thus, outcome control is more likely to be used in firms where a number of
organization subunits are geographically separated and where subordinates are
given authority to participate in important and relatively unprogrammable
decisions. In S&Ls, a common outcome control is responsibility accounting
which provides measures of subunit performance. These subunits can be branches
or functional departments (e.g. loan department) within the S&L. The term
"responsibility accounting" derives from the responsibility borne by subunit
managers for the subunit outcomes (Miller, 1982). Responsibility accounting
is, in effect, an outcome measure that permits S&L management to control
subordinate managers' actions by relating these actions to subunit outcomes.
Given that outcome control will likely be used in situations where organization
structure increases uncertainty about subordinates' actions (Jones, 1984) and
renders behavior control uneconomical (Ouchi and Naguire, 1975), we predict
that:
H3: information-based outcome controls, such as responsibility accounting,
will be used by organizations where structural characteristics greatly
limit the effectiveness and efficiency of behavior controls.
Control Con.lunctivity . Prior research and the integration of organizational
and agency theories suggest that dependencies exist between information-based
controls stemming from their complementary nature. This implies that these
controls will be used conjunctively.
The ability of management to direct internal auditors toward problems
needing investigation is a significant advantage of the organization's internal
monitoring control system (Williamson, 1975). A real-time information system
complements the Internal monitoring system by alerting senior management to
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potential problem areas upon which monitoring can be focused. By selectively
obtaining information as required, reaction time is shortened. Thus, internal
auditing provides an incentive for the use of real-time systems, and we predict
that:
H4: real-time systems will be used by organizations that use internal
auditing.
Likewise, the use of internal auditing complements information-based
outcome control systems. When outcome controls are used, subordinates have
incentives to manipulate the inputs to the outcome measurement system in order
to make the outcomes appear more favorable to themselves. Such manipulations
may take a variety of forms, including actions designed to bias the measures
(Blrnberg et al., 1983). In order to reduce this form of moral hazard
associated with outcome control, organizations can implement monitoring systems
that validate the performance indicators.
As previously discussed. Internal auditing provides evidence of rule
compliance and should be used in more formalized S&Ls. Internal auditors can
also validate outcome measures by examining evidence of the behaviors that lead
to outcomes. Inconsistencies between the evidence of inputs and outcomes
provides a signal that subordinates are manipulating the outcome measures. If
subordinates know that such a signal may be produced, they will be constrained
from engaging in these manipulative behaviors.
Internal auditing may also be linked to outcome controls because it
mitigates the risk imposed upon subordinate managers when they are evaluated
under outcome controls (Hllliamson, 1975). Organizations desire to mitigate
this risk for two reasons. First, mitigating the risk results in a reduction
in the risk premium demanded by the subunit managers. Second, unmitigated, the
imposition of risk creates incentives for subunit managers to undertake less
risky projects than the organization would prefer (Marcus, 1982). Consider the
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loan officer who declines to make a high-return loan for fear that it will go
bad for unforeseeable reasons. By providing evidence that unfavorable outcones
were due to uncontrollable circumstances, internal auditing encourages
subordinate risk-taking propensities consistent with organizational goals.
Thus, internal auditing, linked to responsibility accounting, serves the
purposes of validating outcome measures and reducing the risk borne by
subordinate managers evaluated using the outcome measures. We predict that:
H5: internal monitoring will be used by organizations that use
information-based outcome controls.
To summarize, firms that use internal auditing systems are expected to also
use real-time systems, and firms that use responsibility accounting systems are
expected to also use internal auditing systems (see Figure 2.). Taken to its
logical conclusion, this suggests that, of the possible configurations of
information-based controls, three are most likely to be used. The result is
that an ordered pattern of controls will be observed. We predict that:
H6: real-time systems, internal auditing and responsibility accounting
will be used in three configurations: (1) real-time systems alone, (2)
internal auditing and real-time systems, and (3) responsibility
accounting, internal monitoring, and real-time systems.
{Figure 2.)
The remainder of this study deals with empirics. The sample and method are
discussed, followed by a description of the measures. Next, the results of the
empirical tests are presented and discussed. Finally, implications of the
study for future controls research are presented.
Sampling Method
The sample consists of 109 randomly selected, geo^aphically diverse
savings and loan (S&L) associations from all Federal Home Loan Bank districts.
Use of a one industry sample controls for the effects of differing
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transfornatlon processes on controls. Firms within the same Industry are more
likely to have similar transformation processes than firms from different
Industries, and, consequently, Interactions between structure and
transformation process are minimized. Designing a study that considers both
the effects of structure and transformation process simultaneously Is ambitious
because the interactions between the two are not well understood. To the
extent, however, that such Interactions affect control configuration, the
external validity of this study may be limited.
Two Instruments were used In this study: a senior officer questionnaire and
an accounting questionnaire. The questionnaires were pretested using 16 pilot
firms which are not used In the final sample. Three senior officer
questionnaires and one accounting questionnaire were nailed to each of 173
S&Ls, and 141 (81.5%) responded. The chief executive officer (CEO) was asked
to complete one of the senior officer questionnaires and Instruct the S&L's
chief financial officer (CFO) and chief lending officer (CLO) to complete the
others. The respondents were given written directions for completing the
questionnaires which included instructions prohibiting discussion of the
responses. After completing the questionnaire, the respondents returned the
instruments directly to the first author using a preaddressed envelope. The
CFO also completed the accounting questionnaire. The questionnaires resulted
in usable data on 109 firms. The remainder were eliminated because of missing,
incomplete or amblglous responses.
Measures
Each of the three types of controls was dichotomously coded, 1 if the
control is used, otherwise. Real-time systems (RTS) was given a value of 1
if the S&L uses either or both of two real-time accounting information systems
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available to S&Ls: on-line general ledger and automated loan tracking. Each
Improves an S&L's ability to acquire more timely and specific Information.
Internal auditing (lA) was measured as the existence of an internal auditing
function In the firm. Outcome control was measured as the existence of a
responsibility accounting (RA) system in the firm.
Diversification (DIVER) was measured on a scale of to 9, depending upon
the number of services, from a group of nine, that the S&L offers. Each of the
services represents a departure from the traditional mortgage lending function
performed by all S&Ls. The group includes: credit cards, automobile loans,
education loans, signature loans, mobile home loans, secondary loan market
sales, trust services, and building management services.
Spatial complexity (SCPX) , one of the three structural variables, was
measured as the number of different locations from which the S&L operates. The
two remaining structural characteristics, decentralization (DECEN) and
formalization (FORM) were measured by multi-item scales adapted from Ilage and
Aiken's (1967) subscales, "Participation in Decision Making" and "Job
Specificity," which have previously demonstrated reliability and validity
(Appendix A). Slight modifications were made to the scales based on
recommendations of Mulford et al . (1984). A test for unldlmensionali ty using a
common factors model with oblique rotation and an eigenvalue > 1 cutoff was
performed on each scale. The formalization and decentralization scales
produced satisfactory interitem reliability coefficients (Cronbach's Alpha) of
.85 and .92, respectively.
The individual formalization items were anchored by 1 and 5, with 5
indicating greater formalization. The total scores of all three respondents
were added together to form organizational scores. Using the perceptions of
three respondents enhances construct validity by reducing the potential for
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perceptual bias that exists when only one respondent's perceptions are used.
However, It also raises the possibility of unreliable data resulting from
aggregation of widely disparate Individual responses (Robinson, 1950; Price and
Mueller, 1986). The use of aggregated data is warranted where homogeneous
respondents are used (Joyce and Slocum, 1984) and Interpercelver reliability
can be established (Jones and James, 1979). Our respondents were all managers
employed In the sane Industry. This should have minimized perceptual
differences due to employee versus manager and Interindustry perspectives. A
test for Interpercelver reliability, comparing the average within firm variance
to the between subjects variance, produced a satisfactory reliability score of
4
.76. Based on these considerations, aggregation appears Justified.
The individual decentralization items were anchored by 1 and 5, with 5
indicating the highest level of participation in decision-making. The CFO's
and CLO's total scores were added to form an organizational score. In this
study, we are concerned about the uncertainty created when subordinates are
delegated the authority to participate in important and largely unprogrammable
decisions. Delegation to upper level subordinates (e.g. heads of major
functional areas) is likely to be a prerequisite for any lower level
subordinates (e.g. branch managers) to be delegated such authority, and,
consequently, we focus on the former. The CFO and CLO were selected to
represent upper level subordinates because these functions exist in virtually
all S&Ls and provide a common basis of comparison. Further, unlike the
formalization measure in which respondents reported on a purely organizational
phenomenon, decentralization may be individual specific. Consequently, the
decentralization measure does not present the potential for aggregation bias
that the formalization measure presents (See Price and Mueller, 1986, for a
discussion of this point.)
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External auditing cost (EXAC) and total assets (SIZE) were used as control
variables In multivariate tests. External auditing cost was included in
multivariate tests for Internal auditing to control for the possibility that
S&Ls may use Internal auditing to reduce external auditing cost (Simunlc,
1984). Since higher levels of external auditing may sometimes mitigate the
need to use Internal auditing to monitor rule compliance, it is included as a
control variable in the multivariate tests for Internal auditing. Total assets
was Included as a control variable because it is expected that size will be
correlated with both the diversification and structural variables.
Diversification nay lead to increases in size, and it is likely that larger
organizations will be, on average, more formalized, decentralized and spatially
complex. Consequently, including a size measure in the multivariate tests
avoids false Inferences which might result from size being a correlated omitted
variable.
Size was measured as total assets for three reasons. First, It Is the most
common measure of S&L size. For example, total assets is the only size measure
reported In the U. S. League of Savings Institutions' annual directory of its
members. Second, it is the only measure which captures the total financial
resources of the Institution. Third, it is highly associated wltli the number
of employees in S4Ls. Based on the U. S. League's Annual Salary Surveys, the
number of employees in S&Ls varies in a narrow range between .35 and .45
employees per million in assets. Consequently, total assets simultaneously
provides a measure of an S&L's personnel size and its financial size.
Results
Figure 3. presents descriptive statistics. Spearman correlations, reported
here because the controls are measured categorically, show size and external
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auditing cost to be significantly correlated with the dependent variables.
This substantiates their use as control variables in the fflultivariate tests.
{Figure 3.
)
Figure 4. shows the results of parametric and nonparametric univariate
tests supporting the first five hypotheses. The 90 S&Ls using real-time
systens (RTS) were significantly (p = .0001) more diversified than the 19 S&Ls
that did not use RTS. Likewise, the 53 S&Ls using internal auditing (lA) were
significantly (p = .0001) more formalized than the 56 S&Ls not using lA.
Further, the 27 S&Ls using responsibility accounting (RA) were significantly (p
<^ .0002) more decentralized and spatially complex than the 82 S&Ls not using
RA. Finally, the predicted relationships appeared to exist between the
controls. lA was significant (p < .0003) in predicting the use of RTS, and RA
was significant (p = .0001) in predicting the use of lA.
(Figure 4.
)
While useful in showing the unconditional relationships between variables,
the univariate results represent partial tests because they do not consider
conditional relationships among independent variables. Figure 5. presents the
results of multivariate logistic regressions of each dependent variable on its
theoretical and control variables. Logistic regression, a maximum likelihood
technique, is a more appropriate test than discriminate techniques when testing
dichotofflous variables because it makes no assumptions of normality.
{Figure 5.
)
In all three models, SIZE was entered first as a control variable. In
Model 1, DIVER was significant at the p = .0002 level supporting Hypothesis 1
which predicted that more diversified firms would use RTS. lA was also
significant (p = .0518) supporting Hypothesis 4 which predicted that firms
using internal monitoring will also use real-time systems. In Model 2,
external auditing cost (EXAC) was entered as an additional control variable.
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FORM was significant (p = .0005) supporting Hypothesis 2 which predicted that
firns with formalized structures would use Internal auditing. Further, RA was
significant (p = .0311) supporting Hypothesis 5 which predicted that firms
using responsibility accounting will also use Internal auditing. In Model 3,
DECEN (p = .0012) and SPCX (p = .0399) were both significant supporting
Hypothesis 3 which predicted that structural factors that limit the
effectiveness and efficiency of behavior control are associated with the use of
outcome control.
The relationships between the dependent and theoretical variables do not
appear to be the result of spurious size correlations'. SIZE was not
significant In any of the multivariate tests suggesting that Its significant
correlation (see Figure 3.) with the dependent variables results from Its
relationship with the theoretical variables.
Since discriminant analysis Is sensitive to violations of normality, a
modified, two-step, logistic. Jackknlfe procedure was used to estimate
classification accuracy. Regressions were performed In which: (1) each basic
model was estimated ten times (after randomly eliminating approximately one
half of the sample each time) to develop ten sets of coefficients; and (2) the
ten sets of coefficients were used to classify firms as users or non-users of
each control In ten Iterations (again, after randomly eliminating approximately
one half of the sample each Iteration). This resulted in 100 classifications
for each of the three basic models. The average classification accuracies were
computed for each model and compared with the proportional chance criterion for
each model (see Morrison, 1969). F-tests Indicate that the classification
accuracy of all three models Is significantly (p < .0001) higher than those
observed with the naive criterion (see Figure 5.). We conclude that the three
models are capable of reasonably accurate classification of the dependent
variables.
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Stepwise tests were conducted to determine the effects of nulticolllnearlty
on the coefficients of the theoretical variables. The results in Figure 6.
show that these coefficients are affected very little by the presence of the
other theoretical and control variables In the model. It does not appear that
multlcollinearity materially affected the significance of the theoretical
variables in the nultlvariate tests.
(Figure 6.
}
We did not hypothesize a relationship between responsibility accounting and
real-time information systems. Had we done so, path analysis would be the
appropriate test because multiple paths would exist from RA to and RTS.
Howvever, to determine if the relationship of lA with RTS is spurious due to lA
proxylng for a relationship between RA and RTS, Model 1 was re-estimated after
Inserting RA. RA was not significant in predicting the use of RTS, even in
stepwise tests. This provides evidence that the relationship between lA and
RTS does not result from a relationship between RA and RTS.
To Investigate the possibility of interactions between the theoretical
variables, the Interaction terms, DIVERxIA, FORMxRA and DECENxSCPX, were
Inserted in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. None was significant in stepwise
tests while the main effects remained significant. We conclude that the
effects of the thoeretical variables on the controls are additive, not
interactive.
An alternative explanation for the correlations between the controls is
that firms change strategy and structure sequentially so that growth from
diversification Increases size which. In turn, leads first to formalization and
then to decentralization and spatial complexity. In this scenario, the
relationships between the controls are artlfactual. The multivariate tests,
however, do not support this explanation of the relationships among the
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controls. lA and RA are significant in predicting the use of RTS and lA,
respectively, after controlling for the effects of size, strategy and
structure. This would not be the case if the controls were a function of
strategy and structure alone, and It suggests conjunctivity between the
controls.
Hypothesis 6 predicted that, because of conjunctivity, real-tlae systens.
Internal auditing and responsibility accounting controls will be used In three
possible configurations. Figure 7. presents the observed control configuration
frequencies. Approximately 95% of the firms using Information-based controls
used the controls In one of the three predicted configurations. Only two firms
used lA without using RTS. Likewise, only three firms used RA without also
using lA. The observed frequencies of RTS given lA and lA given RA were
compared with the frequencies of RTS and lA expected under the assumption of
independence. In both cases, the adjusted chl-squares (see Slegel and
Castellan, 1988) show that configurations indicating dependency occur
significantly (p = .001) more often than would be expected given Independence.
Thus, It appears that an ordered pattern of controls generally holds as a
result of control conjunctivity.
{Figure 7.)
To learn more about the five firms using the controls Independently, we
investigated their individual strategies and structures. The two firms using
lA without RTS had highly formalized structures with only moderate
diversification. It appears tliat high formalization caused these firms to use
internal auditing, but that they are not diversified enough to economically
Justify real-time Information systems. Two of the firms that used RA and RTS
but not lA have low levels of formalization. These firms may not be able to
cost Justify internal auditing to enforce rule compliance, and the use of
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responsibility accounting may not be sufficient by itself to induce the firm to
use lA. The third firm that used RA and RTS but not lA was highly formalized
implying a strong need for internal auditing. Further, this firm had a low
external auditing cost for its size which suggests that external auditing is
not being substituted for internal auditing. We are unable to suggest a
rationale based on strategy or structure for its lack of control
conjunctivlty. It is possible that its controls are affected by factors not
considered in this study.
Discussion
The empirical results support our predictions regarding the use and
conjunctivlty of the information-based controls investigated. A strategy of
diversification into new and/or riskier services Is associated with the use of
real-time systems which are capable of reducing uncertainty by providing
richer, finer and more timely information about organizational outcomes. A
formalized organizational structure is linked to the use of internal auditing
which can provide feedback on rule compliance. An organizational structure
that limits the effectiveness and efficiency of behavior control is associated
with the use of outcome control. Further, the use of internal auditing Is
generally accompanied by the use of the real-time systems that are capable of
signalling problems needing investigation. Likewise, the use of responsibility
accounting is generally accompanied by internal auditing which provides a
mechanism for validating the outcomes and reducing the risk borne by those
evaluated under outcome control. Finally, the combinations of controls used by
the sample firms fell into an ordered pattern that is predictable given their
conjunctivlty.
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These results provide evidence of a relationship between strategy,
structure and infomation-based controls using a single industry sample to
control for differences in transfornation processes. It appears that the
sanple firms design their control systems to reduce uncertainty about
organizational outcomes and human behavior. The use of these controls appears
to be predicated on a cost/benefit decision. The controls are used when
uncertainty creates a loss of control which must be mitigated.
Evidence that controls are linked to strategy and structure has cost
implications for firms' decisions about alternative investment strategies and
organizational structures. In weighing the costs and benefits of such
alternatives, the costs associated with changes in controls should be included
in the decision model. Failure to do so will result in an underestimation of
the costs and the likelihood that net returns will be less than anticipated.
Previous research (Ouchi, 1979) has suggested that outcome and behavior
controls are substitutes. Our findings, however, indicate that internal
auditing links behavior and outcome controls. In this study we observe
internal auditing, useful in enforcing beliavior control, being used
concurrently with outcome control. Further, the fact that formalization, on
average, is higher in sample firms using both responsibility accounting and
internal monitoring (mean = 50.08) than in firms using only internal monitoring
(mean = 46.83) provides evidence that workplace rules do not diminish with the
advent of outcome controls. These results suggest that behavior and outcome
controls may sometimes be complementary as opposed to being substitutes.
The apparent inconsistency between our results and Ouchi 's predictions,
however, represents a levels problem that can be reconciled by agency theory.
If we view a decentralized, spatially complex firm as a tiered network of
agency relationships in which outcome control is used when structure makes
23
behavior control uneconoiiical , then, based on cost considerations, we expect
only only a subset of the firm's members, usually managers, to be evaluated
using outcome control. As long as employees' tasks are programmable and
observable economically, behavior control will be used within subunits even
when outcome control is used to control subunit managers' actions.
Conclusion - The Future of Controls Research
Besides having implications for the use of information-based control
systems to complement strategy, structure and other controls, this study
provides additional evidence that theoretical integration can be useful in
furthering our knowledge of control systems. The integration of organizational
and agency theories led to predictions regarding controls, supported by
empirical evidence, that could not have been developed based on one of these
theories alone. New approaches to the investigation of controls open numerous
possibilities of further theoretical integration. Jones' (1984) observations
on task visibility and Green and Welsh's (1988) consideration of cybernetics
are recent examples.
Theory and logic lead us to believe that the choice of controls is
influenced by a variety of factors which include: structure, strategy,
transformation process, transaction nature and volume, and environment among
others. It seems doubtful that any single perspective alone will result in a
complete understanding of controls. This argues for more studies that attempt
to integrate theories and develop testable predictions about control systems.
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FOOTNOTES
"Infornatlon-based controls" refers to controls that have the prioary
function of infornation production. "Richness" refers to the number of signals
about various states Information contains. "Fineness" refers to the way In
which a given signal "maps" to a given state or states. A signal that maps to
only one state Is finer than a signal that naps to two possible states.
"Cybernetic" controls are controls that are designed to measure performance
levels and compare those levels to some predetermined standard of performance
through a feedback loop that Identifies performance variances (Green and Welsh,
1988).
2
Factors besides strategy and structure nay influence the use of
Information controls. For example, environmental uncertainty (e.g.
competition) and scale economies (e.g. transaction volume) may Impact the
decision to use real-time information systems. In this study, we limit our
focus to certain relationships between information-based controls and factors
predicted by our Integration of organizational and agency theories.
3
We purposefully avoid developing hypotheses about the relationship
between controls and compensation. Elsenhardt (1985) notes the difficulties in
linking control to compensation where variable compensation is not explicitly
contractual (e.g. promotions). In this study, we focus on information-based
controls that aid in subordinate evaluation and assume that evaluation is
ultimately linked to compensation.
4
The interperceiver reliablity test used in this study is described by
the following equation:
N-1
I
Var
' w
R = II --
N |_ Var, _|
where: R = reliability score, N = seuiple size, Var = average within firms
variance, Var. = between subjects variance. This is analogous to Cronbach's
Alpha.
5
The logistic procedure used in this study is described in the SAS
Institute (1983). Logistic regression employs maximum likeliltood estimation to
determine the probability that an observation is equal to the hypothesized
value. In contrast to multiple discriminant analysis, logistic regression does
not assume multivariate normality and. In fact, makes no distributional
assumptions about the Independent variables. The appropriateness of logistic
regression for testing nonnormally distributed data is discussed in Halperln et
al (1971). The advantage to logistic regression is that it is relatively
robust to violations of normality. With normally distributed data, however,
its estimates are less efficient than OLS estimates. Accordingly, under
conditions of normality, tests of coefficient significance using logistic
regressions are conservative in the sense the test statistics are biased toward
not finding significance. See Aldrich and Nelson (1984) and Halperln et al
.
(1971) for a discussion of the properties of logistic versus OLS regression.
Examination of the sample revealed one large S&L with an Inordinately
high (108) number of operating locations. The results of the multivariate
tests were not materially affected by its deletion from the sample.
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APPENDIX A
Decentralization Questions
What is the frequency of your participation in the following decisions?
Decision Situations
How frequently do you participate
in decisions^on the adoption of
new policies ?
How frequently do you participate
in decisions to hire new officer
and supervisory personnel?
How frequently do you participate
in decisions to promote officer
and supervisory personnel?
Never Rarely Occasionallv Often Always
Fornallzatlon Questions
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following
statements relating to Jobs in your association.
Statements About Jobs
Job descriptions are periodically
reviewed and revised.
Most Jobs in this association have
written Job descriptions.
New staff are provided a formal
orientation.
This association keeps written records
on everyone's Job performance. I
Strongly Slightly Slightly Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
These words or phrases were defined for the respondents.
Note: The entire questionnaires are not presented for the sake of brevity. The
questionnaires contained numerous questions requesting data utilized in other
studies and were several pages long.
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Organization Theory Agency Theory
I
Hunan
(Nature
man Is rational I man is rational and effort
averse
Nature of
Information
information is an alternative (information is an economic
means of controlling behavior [good that is necessary for
I
control
(Basis of
(Control
I
(Role of
(Uncertainty
internal organization contractual relationships
increases need for information ( increases need for and value
[of Information
I
Role of Org
Structure
affects need for control (firm is a network of contracts
I.
[Task Obser-
ability
required for behavior control (required for behavior control
[Task Progr-
ammability
required for behavior control (silent
jRole of
Auditing
silent audits rule compliance
validates outcorae measures
reduces risk borne by subords
Figure 1. Comparison of Organization and Agency Perspectives on Control
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CONTROL
CONJUNCTIVITY
Internal auditing provides
Incentives to use real-tine
systens to signal problems
for investigation by monitors
Outcome control provides
incentives to use internal
monitoring to validate outcomes
and reduce subordinates' risk.
CONTROLS
I
Real-Time |
I
Information! ^'
I Controls I
Internal
Auditing
Controls
|Responsibility|
I
Accounting |
i Controls I
STRATEGY/
STRUCTURE
I
(Diversificatlon into|
I New/Risky Services |
I
Formalization of |
I Policies/Procedures \
I
Decentralization
|
i Spatial Complexity i
Figure 2. Relationships Among Strategy, Structure and Information-Based Controls
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Variable Mean
4.523
Std Dev
2.007
Median
5.000
Mln Max
DIVER 0.000 8.000
FORM 41.560 12.000 43 .000 12.000 60.000
EXAC (XIO^) 15.118 19.164 9 .540 0.000 12.709
DECEN 20.679 5.752 21 .000 6.000 30.000
SCMP 8.872 14.098 4 .000 1.000 108.000
SIZE (X10°) 286.267 515.543 107 .186 7.499 3336.371
• Spearman Corre latlon Coefficients
Variable FORM EXAC DECEN SCPX SIZE RTS lA RA
DIVER .310 .463 .424 .427 .364 .520 .297 .339
FORM .389 .263 .333 .376 .291 .549 .366
EXAC .213 .717 .712 .228 .372 .457
DECEN .189 .170 .232 .311 .348
SCPX .938 .185 .352 .454
SIZE .186 .386 .430
RTS .350 .264
lA .462
Absolute Value Of Coe fflclent Significance Level
>.15 .10
>.18 .05
>.25 .01
DIVER B Diversification SIZE s Total Assets
FORM - Fomallzatlon RTS - Real-Time Information Systems
EXAC = External Auditing Cost lA = Internal Auditing
DECEN - Decentralization RA = Responsibility Accounting
SCPX = Spatial Conplexlty n = 109
Figure 3. Descriptive Statistics
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Theoretical Standard Chl-Square F Value
Varlablie Group n Mean Deviation (SiK Level) (Sie Level)
DIVER RTS 90 5.00 1.709 26.74 39.58
NO RTS 19 2.26 1.790 (.0001) (.0001)
lA RTS 90 0.57 0.498 13.25 14.96
NO RTS 19 0.11 0.315 (.0003) (.0002)
FORM lA 53 48.30 7.812 19.55 46.19
NO lA 56 35.18 11.825 (.0001) (.0001)
RA lA 53 0.07 0.503 23.08 29.08
NO lA 56 0.50 0.227 (.0001) (.0001)
DECEN RA 27 24.15 3.243 11.43 14.71
NO RA 82 19.54 5.951 (.0007) (.0002)
SCPX RA 27 19.96 23.477 30.44 27.71
NO RA 82 5.22 5.795 (.0001) (.0001)
DIVER = Diversification RTS = Real--Time Infornatlon Systems
FORM Foraallzatlon lA " Internal Auditing
DECEN = Decentrallzatlion RA = Responsibility Accounting
SCPX Spcitlal Coaple;Klty n = 109
Figure 4. Univariate Tests
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Model Dep Var Indep Var C oefficient Std Error Chi -Square Sifi Level
1 RTS Intercept -1.6608 0.6747 6.06 .0138
SIZE 0.0015 0.0026 0.31 .5799
DIVER 0.6789 0.1793 14.33 .0002
lA 1.6601 0.8536 3.78 .0518
2 lA Intercept -5.0489 1.1989 17.74 .0000
SIZE
EXAC
0.0030
1.347X10 4
0.0030
.712X10
1.02
0.08
.3127
.7750
FORM 0.0945 0.0271 12.17 .0005
RA 1.6563 0.7684 4.65 .0311
3 RA Intercept -8.2319 2.0485 16.15 .0001
SIZE -0.0008 0.0014 0.30 .5825
DECEN 0.2616 0.0805 10.56 .0012
SCPX 0.1606 0.0781 4.22 .0399
Model Statistics
r2
Theoretical Y Naive Y
Model Chl-Square SIk Level Class Acciiracy Class Accuracy Sic Level
1 37.16 .0000 .489 .8700 .4965 .0001
2 56.38 .0000 .51]I .7526 .4954 .0001
3 40.20 .0000 .418 .7981 .4952 .0001
DIVER = Diversification SIZE Total Assets
FORM » Fornallzatlon RTS Real-Tiae Inforaatiim Systens
EXAC - External Auditing Cost lA Internal Auditing
DECEN " Decentralization RA Responsibility Accounting
SCPX = Spatial Complexity n 109
^r SI 3Z SS ^SSS S
Figure 5. Multivariate Logistic Regressions
~ SI ASSESS S3SS^S3^S^~
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Coefficients (Slg Levels)
Pep Var Var Added Clil-Square Model Slg
RTS DIVER 30.09 .0000
lA 36.68 .0000
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3
lA
RA
0.7831 (.01) 0.6962 (.01)
1.8670 (.03)
FORM
RA
SIZE
SCPX
DECEN
37.89
50.22
56.30
25.18
39.90
.0000
.0000
,0000
0000
0000
0.1242 (.01) 0.1115
2.2253
(.01)
(.01)
0.1190 (.01) 0.1242 (.01)
0.2601 (.01)
No Step 3
0.0947 (.01)
1.6683 (.04)
0.0037 (.10)
No Step 3
DIVER = Diversification
FORM = Foraalization
SCPX = Spatial Complexity
DECEN = Decentralization
SIZE - Total Assets
RTS = Real-Tine Inforaation Systens
lA = Internal Auditing
RA = Responsibility Accounting
Significance level required for entry and retention = .10; n = 109
Figure 6. Stepwise Logistic Regressions
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Configuration
Frequency
Dependent
No Info
Controls
17
I I
RTS
36
RTS+IA RTS+IA+RA
27 24
_Independent
I
LA RA RTS+RA
2 3
Partially
Dependent
lA+RA
Expected Frequency
Observed Frequency
Chi-square (slg level)
1^iras
n
Using IA_
= 53
1
RTS Nc» RTS
43 .77 9.23
51 .00 2.00
15 .08 (.001)
Jlras Using RA_
n = 27
lA No lA
13.12 13.88
24.00 3.00
25.64 (.001)
RTS = Real-Tine Infornation Systems
lA = Internal Auditing
RA = Responsibility Accounting
n = 109
Figure 7. Frequencies of Control Configurations



